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The European Commission is a unique ‘laboratory’ for
supranational institution building.
by Blog Admin
As Morten Egeberg writes, international organisations are typically composed of
representatives with affiliations to the national level. The European Commission, in contrast, is
one of the few international institutions in which key actors owe their allegiances to the
supranational level. Assessing the potential for the Commission to act as a ‘laboratory’ for
experiments in supranational institution building, he finds that nationality plays only a minor
role in influencing the behaviour of Commission staff, and is simply one of many factors
influencing the actions of Commissioners.
Collective problems that cut across sub-national regions are probably most ef f ectively solved through
national institutions to which policy-makers have their primary af f iliation and allegiance. In parallel, societal
challenges which transcend national territories could, arguably, be taken better care of  by supranational
institutions to which decision-makers have their main connection and loyalty. However, except f or a couple
of  EU institutions, the numerous international organisations around the world are not led by polit icians f or
whom the international organisation constitutes their primary institutional af f iliation; on the contrary,
national polit icians are in the driver ’s seat. Thus, although international governmental organisations (IGOs)
may represent organised responses to collective action problems beyond the nation-state, they may be
seen as relatively primitive governance arrangements: if  a nation-state was to be governed through a
structure that parallels the structure of  the IGO, this would have meant that a state would be headed by
delegates f rom its constituent regions, convening in the capital some times a year, and served by a
permanent secretariat.
The ‘problem-solving def icit ’ characterising intergovernmental cooperation was already alluded to by French
social philosopher Saint-Simon (1760-1825) who disappointedly observed the Vienna Congress in 1814,
convened subsequent to the Napoleonic wars in order to re-establish peace among European powers. In
his essay ‘The reorganisation of  the European Community’ he described how the national delegates at the
congress stood up f or their respective countries, but none had the f unction of  standing up f or Europe and
considering questions f rom a general point of  view. The underlying idea was that institutions mould people:
European (supranational) institutions, if  established, would endow policy-makers with a European
perspective just as national institutions so convincingly shape national f rames of  ref erence.
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It took 138 years bef ore a supranational institution
materialised in the f orm of  the European Coal and Steel
Community’s High Authority: the European Commission’s
predecessor. The High Authority was indeed an
innovation, with its init iating and executive f unctions
organised separately f rom the Council of  Ministers, and
with its own leadership entirely committed (in f ormal
terms) to the organisation and European interests.
Thus, the Commission constitutes a unique laboratory
f or studying the extent to which commissioners and their
of f icials actually behave independently f rom their
national origins, and take a broader perspective. It
cannot be taken f or granted that they will behave
independently in this sense: the Commission has also
been portrayed as permeated by national interests and
the College of  Commissioners has been compared to
the Council’s Committee of  Permanent Representatives
(‘Coreper ’). However, a recent review of  the scholarly
literature may have provided a clearer picture of  actual
decision-making within the Commission. (Whether
supranational institutions are desirable or not in
concrete situations is not up f or discussion in this
article.)
Concerning Commission officials, studies have shown a
relationship between their national background and their
attitudes on broad issues like intergovernmentalism vs.
supranationalism. Those coming f rom f ederal or decentralised states tend to be more in f avour of
supranational solutions than their colleagues f rom unitary or centralised states; the reason may be that the
f ormer are already more f amiliar with multilevel governance arrangements. Those who have experience f rom
national administration bef ore entering the Commission are more inclined to hold state-centrist views.
However, when of f icials are asked to specif y more concretely which policies they want to become more
supranational, of f icials’ nationality becomes a less powerf ul explanation than their directorate general (DG)
af f iliation.  Of f icials’ DG af f iliation is also important in order to account f or their economic ideology. As
regards understanding Commission bureaucrats’ decision behaviour, numerous studies, applying dif f erent
methods, indicate that their DG af f iliation is in general the best predictor. This even holds f or the so-called
national experts who are employed on a short- term basis, thus without a clear socialisation potential. In
sum, in order to explain the concerns and interests that Commission of f icials emphasise in their work, one
should probably identif y their organisational role bef ore their national background.
Arguably, the weak point of  the Commission’s organisational design, given that supranationality is a stated
goal f or the organisation, resides in its polit ical leadership. Although commissioners have the Commission
as their primary organisational af f iliation in f ormal terms, the f act that they are nominated by member
states could make them more susceptible to national concerns. Accordingly, studies do indicate that the
national background of  commissioners matters more than the national background of  Commission of f icials
as regards decision behaviour. That said, the role of  commissioners is highly compound: studies indicate
that the portf olio (DG) role may be most f requently evoked, and in addition an overall ‘Commission role’ and
a party-polit ical/ideological role have been observed. The actual behaviour of  commissioners theref ore
displays many commonalit ies with national ministers; both adhering to the concerns of  their respective
departments, local constituencies, polit ical parties and the college as such, although the mix may be
dif f erent. What seems clear is that commissioners (of ten f ormer ministers) tend to behave dif f erently f rom
ministers in the Council, not to speak of  the European Council.
The main reason behind the observed behavioural patterns is probably the organisational design of  the
Commission. First, not only the administrative personnel, but also the polit ical leaders, have the
Commission as their primary af f iliation in f ormal terms. Second, the organisation is specialised according to
sector or f unction rather than territory/geography f rom the top to the bottom, thus creating a decision
environment that partly de-emphasises particular national concerns. Third, there are some additional
f actors that contribute to downplaying the role of  the decision-makers’ nationality. Regarding the services,
multi-national staf f ing even at the unit level of  the administration, the tendency to pursue long careers
entailing a considerable socialisation potential, and merit-based recruitment probably make a dif f erence.
Concerning the college, increasingly multi-national staf f ed cabinets, the Commission president’s right to
(re-)distribute portf olios among commissioners, and the enhanced role of  the European Parliament as
regards the appointment of  the president and the other commissioners probably matter as well.
A more detailed discussion of this topic is available in: Egeberg, M. (2012) ‘Experiments in supranational
institution-building: The European Commission as a laboratory’, Journal of European Public Policy, 19:6, 939-
950.
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